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Every human being possesses an intuitive, deeply rooted notion of freedom, 
which they refer to when discussing the notion. It is natural, since freedom, be-
ing an axiologically marked term, has accompanied human reflection from time 
immemorial: the free people of Israel, the contemplations of Buddha, free Greeks 
and Romans, etc. The fundamental nature of the theme, and the richness and di-
versity of associated matter further complicate the discussion. That requires one 
to conduct an arbitrary classification, and to define, if only a fairly general, meth-
odological framework in order not to become lost in the labyrinth of freedoms.
The search for the answers to such questions as: “What is freedom? How 
should one understand it?” has throughout the ages occupied theologians, phi-
losophers, historians, jurists, artists of all sorts, as well as many other universal 
minds. Resembling polymaths, their ambition was to reach an objective truth, 
which could constitute a firm basis for the understanding of the world. Amongst 
the concepts developed through the years, there exist myriads of interrelated mu-
tually and internally contradictory ideas. For some, that might be a proof of the 
feebleness of Western culture; for others, an indication of its strength resulting 
from its fertility and discursiveness. Clearly, there exists a deep diversity of forms 
and contents hiding behind the façade of a single word: freedom. We know the 
grand interpretations of it, as a subjective experience expressed in the sensing 
of one’s existence.1 Such a type of experiencing was described by Antoine de 
Saint-Exupéry in Night Flight, when being exposed to two expanses, he could 
in silence gaze into himself 2. Already in this example it becomes evident that 
the existentialism-inclined 20th-century reflection referred to ancient problems 
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by describing them using a new language from a different perspective. Yet the 
essence of the notion remains the same: man, i.e. a being limited and liberated 
through his mind in contact with apeiron. That, however, is only one of the many 
reflections of the emotional experience of freedom. Did not Henryk Elzenberg, 
toiling with strenuous self-disciplines with existence, thus express his spiritual 
independence, subjectivity, and separateness? In short: freedom?3 At the time 
when he was developing his philosophical journal, Andrzej Bobkowski managed 
to describe his experience of freedom viewed from a bicycle, and from the edge of 
a Paris table bent under the weight of piles of books.4 Elzenberg was still creating 
his intellectual testament when Czesław miłosz fled towards freedom in the, still 
controversial even today, Taqiya cloak5, while Herbert was constructing his for-
tress of spiritual aristocracy. All the mentioned intellectuals directly or indirectly 
struggled with freedom trying to understand and tame it. It is nearly a cliché to 
conclude that the reading of each of them offers enriching food for thought. Yet 
that banal statement is necessary to realise that within the zone which applies to 
every individual experience, the above-mentioned output is priceless, but at the 
same time it has no ambition to transcend outside the zone of description or sensa-
tion. That deficiency constitutes neither a flaw nor an advantage; it is the imma-
nent characteristic of the presented form and content of the experience of reality.
A considerably different nature applies to political and legal philosophy, the 
essence of which lies in its particular claim for reality, the aim of which is to 
ensure its revolutionary or evolutionary change, or to preserve the existing state. 
One characteristic of such a reflection is the search for axiological solutions which 
could serve the institutionalisation of various human pursuits within the public 
sphere. Yet freedom has always constituted the object of a conflict both at the 
layer of its definition and within the sphere of practice it implies. Since the Greek 
philosophers there have been battles waged in the pages of various treatises over 
the shape and the extent of freedom. At this point one must consider why, from 
amongst such important disputes as the one between Saint Thomas Aquinas and 
Augustine of Hippo, Protestants and Catholics, the adherents of absolutism and 
the eulogists of limited rule, Enlightenment reformers and revolutionaries stand-
ing against the first conservatives, liberals and socialists, or anarchists and so-
cialist democrats. As the focus of my reflection I chose the relationship between 
republicanism and liberalism present at the level of defining freedom.6
 3 Vide H. Elzenberg, Kłopot z istnieniem. Aforyzmy w porządku czasu, Wydawnictwo Uniwer-
sytetu mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2002.
 4 Zob. A. Bobkowski, Szkice piórkiem, Towarzystwo Opieki nad Archiwum Instytutu Litera-
ckiego w Paryżu, Warsaw 2011.
 5 Vide Cz. miłosz, Zniewolony umysł, Instytut Literacki, Paris 1980.
 6 This issue constitutes an area of interest of researchers due to the revival of republican 
thought, and an attempt to adapt it to the reality of liberal democracy (vide m. Gajek, W stronę 
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Both streams of political and legal reflection consider freedom as a central 
value, but, at the same time, they display different approaches to it, which for ages 
have competed for supremacy. Both intellectual traditions considerably shaped 
the political and social reality of continental Europe and the English-speaking 
world, and despite the fundamental differences separating them, they dialecti-
cally complement each other. The synergy was not overlooked by some thinkers, 
who tried to reconcile contradictory categories; hence the non-accidental name 
of the American republican party, the demands of which express the 19th and 
20th-century spirit of liberalism. Both streams were particularly interrelated in 
the 17th and the 18th c. when republicanism, being a mature intellectual move-
ment, experienced its second rebirth, while the basic categories of liberalism 
were only forming. At that time, some Dutch, English, and French authors dis-
cussed the issue of freedom from the liberal and republican perspective, which 
stimulated the change of existing political, cultural, and legal paradigms. Yet 
the alliance between the two traditions did not last long, as the already mature 
Enlightenment and the 19th c. forgot about or modified republicanism, which in 
the new form was presented to the world during the French Revolution, and they 
made liberalism the most popular mode of thinking about politics and law.
Republicanism constitutes a stream of political and legal philosophy the roots 
of which reach antiquity. Despite the numerous disputes regarding the diagnosis 
of its origins, one must conclude that the first concrete study, republican in nature, 
was offered by Aristotle in Politics7. He introduced the now classical assumption 
on the social nature of man, who is to fully fulfil his pursuits within a community 
of man. That was also the starting point for the arguments of republican thinkers 
on the need for mutual cooperation between citizens focussed on the care for the 
community, which was supposed to constitute an expression of natural human 
predispositions. The reflections of Alexander the Great were further enriched by 
Roman authors: Cicero, Titus Livius, and Sallust. The mentioned authors created 
the core republican literature, which was read and analysed in the Renaissance in 
Italian cities (Florence and Venice in particular), 16th and 17th-century Netherlands, 
republikańskiego liberalizmu. Kategoria cnót liberalnych we współczesnej amerykańskiej myśli 
politycznej, OmP, Krakow–Warsaw 2016; B. Brugger, Republican Theory in Political Thought. 
Virtuous or Virtual?, macmillan Press Ltd, London 1999; S.D. Collins, Aristotle and the Redis-
covery of Citizenship, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006; R. Dagger, Civic Virtues. 
Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997), as well 
as in consideration of historical syncretic projects which combined the categories of those two 
intellectuals streams (vide D. Armitage, A. Himy, Q. Skinner (ed.), Milton and Republicanism, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995; N. Bobbio, m. Viroli, The Idea of the Republic, Pol-
ity Press, Cambridge 2003; Q. Skinner, B. Stråth, States & Citizens. History, Theory, Prospects, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003).
 7 Vide D. Pietrzyk-Reeves, Ład Rzeczypospolitej. Polska myśl polityczna XVI wieku a klasycz-
na tradycja republikańska, Księgarnia Akademicka, Krakow 2012, pp. 7–164.
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England, and the First Polish Republic. That republicanism, which is the focus 
of my study, is defined as classical contrary to modern republicanism, the main 
quality of which is anti-monarchism.8 One must assume after Pietrzyk-Reeves 
that classical republicanism is based on two pillars: the view of the state as a tele-
ological political community which constitutes a common good of all the citizens, 
and the view of politics as the creation and maintenance of political order based 
on law and justness, i.e. bearing the name of a fair order. A characteristic quality 
of that approach is the absence of the individual perspective and the fact of em-
phasising a communal nature.9 A republican will assign importance to a commu-
nity understood as a political body realising care for a common good, i.e. she/he 
will not consider it within the categories of the sum of individual benefits, rather 
as a self-contained value independent of those. That assumption results in the 
conviction about the duties of every citizen to care for the community, which is 
expressed in the active creation of that which is generally beneficial to all. When 
considering that perspective, one recognises the principle of equality as the duty 
of every member of a community is to participate in the creation and ensuring 
of the common good, which in itself is egalitarian as it spans over all citizens 
in equal measure – not allowing the establishment of any privileges or special 
concessions. Therefore, republican thinkers revered the Greek procedure of ostra-
cism highly, the essence of which they saw in the ousting from common space any 
individuals threatening the existing order, even if they could have possessed great 
virtues. Yet it was not the grandness, in the spirit of Thomas Carlyle’s philosophy, 
that, according to republicans, was admirable, but the communal nature. Thus, 
the described paradigm was closer to the well-known legend by Aristotle about 
the counsel Periander gave the tyrant of Miletus Thrasybulus to cut the tallest 
ears, which indicated that one must always cut off the principal citizens.10 Every-
thing, though, depended on how one defined the term principal citizens. Perian-
der suggested that Thrasybulus remove those individuals who could endanger his 
despotic rule. For a republican to cut off the principal citizens meant a mechanism 
for removing exceptionally talented individuals who, due to exorbitant passions 
and ambition, could lead to a subversion of the order, and replacing it with tyr-
anny or another captive system. Thus we arrived at the issue of freedom.
For the republican tradition, freedom was one of the main values. It was 
described on two complementary strata: the state and community, and the indi-
vidual. The former was reflected in the stipulation to establish and maintain free 
order. It was a result of the implementation of all republican assumptions of a po-
litical and legal nature, which were to lead to the existence of a free system. The 
 8 D. Pierzyk-Reeves, Ład Rzeczypospolitej…, p. 9.
 9 Ibid.
 10 Arystoteles, Polityka, trans. L. Piotrowicz, PWN, Warsaw 2008, p. 157.
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sine qua non of the fulfilment of freedom within that stratum was the principle 
of equal justice under law, of the rule of law, of a sovereign people, of the priority 
of the common interest over individual interests, etc. Individually viewed repub-
lican freedom possessed a participatory nature. man could define himself as free 
when he was a citizen, i.e. when he was entitled to participate in the state’s politi-
cal life. Thus defined freedom, Benjamin Constant, a French liberal thinker who 
lived at the turn of the 19th c., called ancient.11 In his opinion freedom in antiquity 
was not realised within the private zone, and it was actually separated from it. The 
fact of being free meant active participation in the creation, and the application of 
law, passing judgments, and voicing opinions during public meetings. Therefore, 
it was “freedom to”, i.e. a free man was a citizen who became free through his 
own political activeness. The characters from the pages of History of Rome by 
Titus Livius could shout in unison: we are free because we have the right to care 
for the common good!
That would cause fear in a liberal, who saw the source of freedom in other 
streams of thought. Liberalism cannot boast a Virgilian pedigree, even though it 
refers to individualistic categories developed by sophists, Epicureans, and Stoics. 
Its history began in the 17th c. when, under the influence of the school of the laws 
of nature (notable representatives of which included Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbs, 
and Spinoza), as well as Protestant articles, there formed its first foundations in 
opposition to the proponents of monarchic absolutism.12 John Locke, an English 
Empiricist, is considered the author of the first organised and mature liberal con-
cept; when in Two Treatises of Government he presented his basic philosophi-
cal assumptions, he triggered the most influential ideological stream which has 
remained the leading stream since the end of the 18th c.13 Even though one would 
be accurate to associate liberalism with a reflection which considers freedom as 
the foundation of all public relations, one should not reduce it only to the special 
manner of defining the notion, and to the superior role assigned to it in relation to 
other values. Just as in the case of republicanism, liberalism is based on a range 
of philosophical assumptions, which are supposed to bring people’s freedom in 
a society. To achieve that, it refers to the concept of an individual as the subject 
of natural laws and rights, an individual who possesses axiological priority in 
relation to the state or the society. Liberalism is based on the anthropological 
individualistic perspective which precludes the priority of the common good over 
the good of an individual. Thus the liberals’ emphasising the limited nature of 
 11 B. Constant, “O wolności starożytnych i nowożytnych”, trans. Z. Kosno, Arka 1992, issue 42, 
pp. 243–254.
 12 Vide Z. Rau, Liberalizm. Zarys myśli politycznej XIX i XX wieku, Fundacja Aletheia, War-
saw 2000, pp. 9–15.
 13 Vide Z. Rau, Wstęp, in: John Locke, Dwa traktaty o rządzie, trans. Z. Rau, PWN, Warsaw 
1992, pp. CVII–CVIII.
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government, the origin of which they traced back to the individual. A govern-
ment had to, according to them, be bound by law for it not to endanger the rights 
of the citizens, which could be broken through a state’s pressure existing only 
based on a voluntary acceptance of the government. Often, liberals have referred 
to the concept of a social contract, thus deriving the competences to govern as 
well as the requisition for obedience towards the government from an individual’s 
consent.14 In order to limit a governing power which they associated with a threat, 
they stipulated the introduction of a division into governing bodies and the insti-
tutions of the right of revolution, which in time transformed into the concept of 
civil disobedience.
All the quoted categories and safeguards were supposed to ensure an indi-
vidual’s freedom. Liberalism did not deprecate the obligation to participate in 
governing nor did it negate the importance of the public sphere for the society. 
Its main assumption was the reversal of the philosophical and political order. For 
liberals, the zone of freedom is a space of unconstrained, i.e. free of any external 
interventions (e.g. of the state), activity, the limits of which would be damage or 
harm caused to another individual. Thus liberalism defined a definition of free-
dom different from the republican one; one which is often called a negative free-
dom, a freedom “from”. According to a liberal, man can only be free when her/his 
zone of governance and decision-making will not be violated by factors external 
in relation to it, e.g. the actions of a government, taxes, legislation, etc. Obviously 
that does not mean the absolutisation of the spheres of freedom and property. It 
applies to internal interventions which transcend the framework of a legal order 
(natural and positive), which threatens the system of the above-mentioned insti-
tutional safeguards.
The difference between the republican and the liberal understandings of free-
dom can be illustrated with a simple example: a liberal going on holiday would 
say: I feel free from work; a republican giving up his holiday would say: I am free 
because I can work.
By employing the presented ideal models, which in a general manner charac-
terise republicanism and liberalism, one can arrive at several important questions, 
answers to which carry serious consequences for political and social life. One of 
those, which is particularly significant for the issue of freedom, was studied in 
the 19th c. by Alexis de Tocqueville. The French thinker considered individualism 
which constituted one of the axiological foundations of liberalism.15 He noted 
that in a democratic system, individuals who become interested in the sphere 
of private egoisms lose interest in the course of public affairs. That lack of care 
 14 Vide Z. Rau, m. Chmieliński, Umowa społeczna i jej krytycy w myśli politycznej i prawnej, 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2010, pp. 7–32.
 15 Vide m. Tracz-Tryniecki, Myśl polityczna i prawna Alexisa de Tocqueville, Księgarnia Aka-
demicka, Krakow 2009.
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for the extra-individual sphere leads, according to Tocqueville, to governance 
by a majority, which transforms into the despotism of equality because socially 
alienated individuals interested only in their own benefit are helpless in the face 
of the omnipotence of democratic rule.16 The ascertainment of the French aristo-
crat touched the sensitive tension between liberalism and republicanism, i.e. the 
balance between the qualitative and quantitative engagement of an individual in 
public affairs. Tocqueville emphasised the significance of the mutual relationship 
between the individual and public affairs indicating that individualism may lead 
to a decline of freedom.
The debate regarding the superiority of the republican vision of freedom over 
the liberal vision and vice versa has remained one of the fundamental problems 
of political and legal philosophy. Not surprisingly, it has not been conclusive. Yet 
in the situation of the slow but gradual revival of the republican discourse, e.g. in 
the works of Philip Petitt,17 when liberalism is still a lively idea-based force, the 
question about the two types of freedom remains valid.
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Freedom in community or freedom in solitude? 
Remarks on republicanism and liberalism
(Summary)
A political thought is an area of legitimate contribution of competitive ideas. Liberalism is 
often considered as one of the most significant and influential paradigm of our times. The com-
mon acceptance of liberal conception of negative liberty can be acknowledged as a proof of this 
tendency. At the same time clearly visible is the renaissance of republicanism and the conception 
of active participation in governance. The liberal and republican assumptions have similar roots 
but different social practices. The aim of this paper is to examine in contrast liberal and republican 
conceptions of freedom. The author discusses main categories of both political traditions: state, 
commonwealth, common good, citizen, individualism, law, limited power and freedom itself. The 
author attempts to compere republicanism and liberalism as the competitive political paradigms to 
show the dilemmas of modern states and societies where there is no common consensus referring 
to definition of liberty.
Keywords: republicanism, liberalism, freedom, common good, commonwealth, political 
thought, politics, political philosophy, history of ideas, individualism
